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1. INTRODUCTION 
In this study, we investigate how peer group overlap within relative performance evaluation (RPE) 
contracts of executives influences firms’ competitive aggressiveness. While an RPE contract of a 
specific firm by definition includes peers against which executives are compared, those peers 
themselves not necessarily need to use RPE, or if they use RPE, they might not include the focal 
firm as part of their peer group. We exploit this variation in RPE contract design and argue that 
peer group overlap (Firm A selects Firm B as peer and vice versa) induces strategic interaction, 
which increases competitive aggressiveness. 
While the prevalence of RPE in executive compensation contracts has long been debated in 
prior research (see, e.g., Antle and Smith, 1986; Janakiraman et al., 1992), recent evidence suggests 
that its use has largely increased. For example, in the period from 2006 to 2016, RPE in executive 
contracts has doubled, and approximately 57% of the S&P 500 firms use some form of RPE in 
their compensation contracts (Bizjak et al., 2018; Equilar, 2017). By incorporating RPE in 
compensation contracts, firms can filter common noise from performance, thereby increasing 
contracting efficiency (see, e.g., Baiman and Demski, 1980; Holmström, 1982; Lazear and Rosen, 
1981). The extent to which firms benefit from such efficiency gains depends on the competitive 
environment (e.g., Gong et al., 2011; Matsumura and Shin 2006; Vrettos 2013). For example, Gong 
et al. (2011) find that the use of RPE increases with product market competition, arguing that 
increased competition goes hand in hand with a higher degree of common shocks. 
In contrast to these prior studies, which focus on the antecedents of RPE adoption, such as 
competition, we focus on examining the impact of different design features within RPE contracts. 
In particular, we examine how specific features within RPE contracts influence firms’ competitive 
aggressiveness over and above the existing product market competition. It is important to note that 
competitive aggressiveness is not the same as general product market competition. Competitive 
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aggressiveness refers to the repertoire of competitive actions a firm takes, such as changes in the 
pricing strategy, taking legal actions, product changes, or mergers and acquisitions (Ferrier, 2001; 
Ferrier et al., 1999). As such, even within highly competitive markets, firms can act more or less 
aggressively. 
 The RPE contract design feature that we examine is the extent to which there is overlap in 
the peer groups between firms using RPE. RPE contracts involve peer firms against which 
executives of the focal firm are being compared. However, these peer firms might or might not use 
RPE themselves and include the focal firm in their peer group. The higher the fraction of peers that 
also involve the focal firm in their RPE contracts, the higher the peer group overlap. We argue that 
this peer group overlap induces strategic interaction between firms, and in turn affects the 
competitive actions of the firms. Hence, to understand the consequences of adopting RPE contracts, 
it is important to distinguish RPE contracts that involve peer group overlap from those contracts 
that do not. Our research design allows us to empirically make this distinction. 
If firms overlap in their peer groups, they are in direct performance competition with each 
other. That is, whenever one firm increases its performance, it automatically decreases relative 
performance of its peers, and vice versa. This strategic interaction gives executives strong 
incentives to outperform their peers and hence to take competitive actions that improve their own 
relative performance (Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999a). In contrast, when RPE contracts do not 
involve any peer group overlap, strategic interaction among firms is muted and firms will show a 
relatively lower level of competitive aggressiveness. Thus, while firms will always act 
competitively aggressive to some extent (Ferrier, 2001), we argue that peer group overlap creates 
strategic interaction between firms that encourages them to increase their competitive 
aggressiveness incrementally. 
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To test our prediction, we construct a comprehensive dataset using executive compensation 
information manually retrieved from the Compensation Discussion and Analysis section of the 
SEC proxy statements. Proxy statements provide information regarding the constituents of each 
RPE firm’s peer group. Using this information, we create a network of all RPE contracts, and 
measure peer group overlap as the number of overlapping peer relationships scaled by the peer 
group size for each firm-year. To measure competitive aggressiveness, we use structured content 
analysis of newspaper headlines and identify the competitive actions of firms. Following the 
strategic management literature (e.g., Ferrier, 2001; Ferrier et al., 1999; Nadkarni et al., 2016; 
Ndofor et al., 2011; Rindova et al., 2010), we measure the volume and the complexity of these 
actions. Importantly, strategic management literature suggests that the specific type of 
aggressiveness (high volume or high complexity), varies with the competitive environment firms 
are operating in. While industries in the growth stage are typically associated with high volume 
strategies, industries in the mature stage are associated with highly complex strategies. Thus, we 
split our analysis in the different life cycle stages of the industry (i.e., growth and mature phase). 
To classify industries in the different life cycle stages, we rely on Cantrell and Dickinson’s (2018) 
concept of industry life cycle. 
We find that peer group overlap is indeed associated with higher firms’ competitive 
aggressiveness. Specifically, we find that in growing industries firms with higher peer group 
overlap also take a higher volume of competitive actions; in mature industries, peer group overlap 
is associated with competitive actions that are more complex. Thus, while firms with higher peer 
group overlap in RPE contracts show higher competitive aggressiveness, the specific form of how 
they carry out their aggressiveness differs among the life cycle stages of the industry. 
To provide more insights into these associations, in terms of their causal nature, we perform 
the following analysis. We exploit the fact that when a focal firm’s peer adds the focal firm to its 
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own peer group, it triggers an exogenous shock to the focal firm’s peer group overlap. Thus, we 
compare the competitive aggressiveness of firms after being added by a peer with an entropy 
balanced control group of RPE firms without any peer group overlap. Due to the limited amount 
of changes in the peer groups during the mature phase, we have to restrict this analysis to the growth 
stage. The results are in line with our main analysis and show that firms in the growth stage show 
a higher volume of competitive actions in the year after being added to the peer firms peer group 
compared to firms in the control group.  
Moreover, our theory predicts that it is not RPE per se that enhances the strategic interaction 
and competitive aggressiveness, but the peer group overlap in the RPE contracts. In an additional 
analysis, we therefore compare the competitive aggressiveness among three types of firms: RPE 
firms with peer group overlap, (ii) RPE firms without peer group overlap, and (iii) firms not using 
RPE at all. The results are in line with our theory and show that RPE firms with peer group overlap 
show higher competitive aggressiveness compared to non-RPE firms, while there are only minor 
differences between RPE firms without peer group overlap and non-RPE firms. 
We also perform the following robustness tests: (i) measure the complexity in the 
competitive actions with the deviation from industry norms, (ii) replace the industry life cycle 
indicator with numerous underlying industry characteristics, and (iii) control for the firm-specific 
life cycle stage. The results are robust to these modifications. 
 Our study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we show how RPE contracts 
are related to firms’ competitive aggressiveness. Analytical studies have shown the benefits of 
using relative performance evaluation to increase contracting efficiency (e.g., Baiman and Demski, 
1980; Holmström, 1982; Lazear and Rosen, 1981). Supporting these claims, recent studies show a 
widespread use of RPE in executives’ compensation contracts (Bizjak et al., 2018), and that firms 
consider their competitive environment in their decision to adopt RPE (e.g., Vrettos 2013; 
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Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999a; Gong et al., 2011). We go beyond these studies and show how 
RPE, and in particular the peer group overlap in RPE contracts, influences firms’ decision-making 
once firms adopt RPE. Such insights improve our understanding of the costs and benefits of RPE 
contracts. 
Second, we decompose RPE contracts and distinguish RPE with peer group overlap and 
RPE without peer group overlap. While prior literature often treats RPE as a uniform construct, 
disclosures in the Compensation Discussion and Analysis section of the SEC proxy statements 
suggest that there is variation in the features of these contracts. In our sample, all the firms that use 
RPE specify a peer group against which their executives are being compared. However, the extent 
to which the focal firm is also part of their peers’ executive contracts varies. This allows us to 
isolate the strategic interaction from the noise reduction component in RPE contracts. We show 
that it is especially peer group overlap that induces the strategic interaction among firms, which 
increases their competitive aggressiveness. In fact, our results suggest that RPE without peer group 
overlap has only minor effects on competitive aggressiveness, while peer group overlap in RPE 
contracts is associated with a significant increase in competitive aggressiveness. It is thus important 
to distinguish different forms of RPE contracts when examining its effects. This has also significant 
implications for the transferability of research results from within firm tournaments to executive 
RPE contracts, and vice versa. While there is typically a peer group overlap in RPE contracts within 
firms (e.g., Matsumura and Shin 2006), this is not necessarily the case for RPE contracts across 
firms.  
Finally, in studying the effect of peer group overlap on firms’ competitive aggressiveness, 
we combine insights from accounting and strategic management. While competitive actions trigger 
many accounting-related issues, such as earnings management (e.g., Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; 
Roychowdhury, 2006) and disclosure (e.g., Ali, Klasa, Yeung, 2014; Glaeser, 2018; Park, Sani, 
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Shroff and White, 2019), the accounting literature has largely ignored the effect of accounting-
related choices on such actions. Given that competitive aggressiveness is an established and 
validated construct (see, e.g., Ferrier, 2001; Ferrier and Lyon, 2004; Ferrier et al., 1999; Nadkarni 
et al., 2016; Ndofor et al., 2011), this construct provides amply opportunity for future accounting 
research. 
We organize the remainder of the paper as follows. Section 2 provides relevant background 
information and develops our hypothesis. Section 3 describes our research design. We discuss our 
results in Section 4 and provide concluding remarks in Section 5. 
 
2. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS 
2.1. Background 
In his seminal paper, Holmström (1982) develops an economic theory of relative performance 
evaluation. Analyzing a setting with multiple agents, he shows that if the agent’s performance and 
performance of his peers are exposed to common shocks, it is optimal to include peer performance 
in the agent’s incentive contract. This optimality follows from the opportunity to use peer 
performance to filter out common noise from performance, leading to more efficient incentives.  
The strong theoretical arguments underlying RPE triggered a stream of empirical studies in 
the mid–1980s and 1990s examining the use of RPE, predominately in the context of executive 
compensation (see, e.g., Antle and Smith, 1986; Barro and Barro, 1990; Gibbons and Murphy, 
1990; Janakiraman et al., 1992). The evidence of these studies on the use of RPE was mixed. 
However, after the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission amended the disclosure 
requirements for executive compensation in 2006, direct evidence suggests that a large fraction of 
firms uses RPE to evaluate their executives (e.g., Bizjak et al., 2018; Equilar, 2017). Therefore, the 
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emphasis has moved towards examining firms’ rationale to adopt RPE. In line with the noise 
reduction argument from Holmström (1982), Albuquerque (2014) and Gong et al. (2011) 
empirically show that common noise exposure is a notable predictor of using RPE. 
 However, as Holmström (1982) points out, this efficient use of information induces 
competition between agents. While he argues that such competition is valueless beyond 
information extraction purposes, other studies suggest that strategic interaction induced by RPE 
can be potentially costly to firms. For example, as a consequence of RPE-induced competition, 
agents may sabotage and shirk (Gibbons and Murphy 1990). Following this logic, Aggarwal and 
Samwick (1999a) and Vrettos (2013) argue that strategic interaction resulting from RPE can be so 
costly to firms that in some environments (i.e., product complementarity) they are reluctant to use 
RPE contracts. However, empirical evidence of whether and how strategic interaction resulting 
from RPE affects the competitive actions of firms and their aggressiveness is absent. In addition, 
prior studies that examine issues of strategic interaction typically assume that all agents work under 
the same compensation scheme, where they directly affect each other’s compensation. While such 
a setting is often observed within firms (e.g., Matsumura and Shin 2006), it is less obvious at an 
executive level, where RPE contracts are created between firms. For example, when Firm A uses 
an RPE contract with Firm B included in its peer group, it is not a required that Firm B itself has 
an RPE contract nor that Firm A is in its peer group, if RPE is used. As we will argue, only if Firm 
B uses RPE as well and Firm A is included as peer, significant strategic interaction is present, 
which affects competitive aggressiveness. This is the focus of our study.  
2.2. Competitive aggressiveness 
In an attempt to gain market share and gain a competitive advantage over competitors, firms engage 
in competitive actions (Ferrier, 2001; Ferrier et al., 1999). As Ferrier (2001) states it: “As they 
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navigate the competitive landscape, firms often directly and aggressively challenge competitors in 
an effort to improve relative performance.” A large stream of literature in strategic management 
examines determinants and consequences of such competitive actions (Chen et al., 2010a; Chen et 
al., 2010b; Derfus et al., 2008; Eisenhardt and Martin 2000; Ferrier 2001; Ferrier and Lyon 2004; 
Ferrier et al., 1999; Nadkarni et al., 2016; Ndofor et al., 2011, and Rindova et al., 2010). 
Competitive actions are moves a firm makes to target its competitors, or countermoves a firm 
makes in response to its competitors’ moves (Hambrick et al., 1996). As an example, a competitive 
action might include the introduction of a new promotional campaign that disrupts a market, or it 
may refer to the acquisition of another firm in order to gain synergistic benefits (Ferrier et al., 
1999). Collectively, these actions reflect the aggressiveness of the firm. The more frequent those 
actions are taken, or the more variation in total repertoire of actions, the more aggressively firms 
act (e.g., Ferrier et al., 1999).  
2.3. Hypothesis Development 
While firms will always act competitively aggressive to some extent (Ferrier, 2001), we argue that 
peer group overlap in RPE contracts creates strategic interaction among firms, which increases 
their competitive aggressiveness incrementally over using RPE without peer group overlap. Peer 
group overlap puts executives in direct performance competition with each other. Whenever one 
firm increases its performance, it automatically decreases the relative performance of its peers, and 
vice versa. Thus, the actions of one firm directly impact the performance and compensation of its 
peers (Holmström, 1982; Lazear and Rosen, 1981). To improve own relative performance and 
succeed in such a setting, theory suggests that firms increase their aggressiveness (Aggarwal and 
Samwick, 1999a; Lazear and Rosen, 1981). However, when executives utilize an aggressive 
competitive strategy in such a setting, peers are likely to strike back by increasing their competitive 
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aggressiveness towards the focal firm as well. Hence, both firms adopt an aggressiveness strategy 
to outperform each other. In contrast, without peer group overlap, this strategic interaction between 
the focal RPE firm and its peers is muted. In such a setting, firms are less likely to adopt a 
competitively aggressive strategy to outperform each other. 
While we argue that peer group overlap increases competitive aggressiveness, firms could 
alternatively collude with overlapping peers by not taking competitive actions towards each other. 
Given legal restrictions (i.e., antitrust and competition laws), such a scenario would be based on 
trust between firms, though. As soon as executives get doubtful about the reliability of these 
arrangements and expect a competitive action of peers at some point in time, this anticipation is 
sufficient to unravel the collusion based on trust. As a result, while such a scenario is possible, it 
is less likely to play out in practice. Therefore, we predict that the greater peer group overlap, the 
greater competitive aggressiveness. More formally: 
H1: Peer group overlap is positively associated with competitive aggressiveness. 
 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
3.1. Identifying RPE firms 
To examine our research question, we must first identify RPE contracts in executives 
compensation. We follow Gong et al. (2011), Park and Vrettos (2015), and Vrettos (2013), and 
hand collect data for the fiscal years 2012 through 2014 from the proxy statements of the S&P 
1,500 firms using the Securities and Exchange Commission’s EDGAR database. We examine the 
Compensation Discussion and Analysis section of the proxy statements and identify the presence 
of an RPE contract for a firm-year observation if (i) the firm’s proxy statement explicitly states that 
at least one component of executive compensation is determined based on the firm’s performance 
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relative to performance of other firms, and (ii) the firm uses and explicitly states the self-selected 
performance peer group.1 Appendix A exemplifies an RPE contract for Unit Corporation. Our final 
sample consists of 181 unique RPE firms with 472 firm-year observations. 
3.2. Measuring Peer Group Overlap 
We identify peer group overlap by analyzing all firm-peer relationships and record which 
relationships are “singular” and which are “dual”. Singular peer relationships are those 
relationships whereby the focal firm has another firm selected as a peer, but this peer firm does not 
have the focal firm as a RPE peer. In a dual peer relationship the peer firm also has the focal firm 
selected as peer. Thus, if a relationship is dual, there is a “peer group overlap”. We then count the 
number of overlapping peer relationships per firm-year and scale that by the peer group size for 
that firm-year. The higher the fraction of dual relationships in an RPE contract, the higher the peer 
group overlap. 
3.3. Measuring Competitive Aggressiveness 
To measure the competitive aggressiveness, we follow strategic management literature and 
measure the volume of competitive actions, and the complexity of the competitive actions. The  
volume captures the total number of competitive actions within a given period. The more actions a 
firm takes, the higher its competitive aggressiveness. However, not all actions are identical – 
launching a new marketing campaign is a fundamentally different action than suing competitors. 
Therefore, actions can be classified into different categories such as capacity, legal, marketing, 
pricing, and product (Ferrier et al., 1999). Taking actions from various categories simultaneously 
                                                 
1 Firms that use indexed peer groups are excluded from our study, because we are primarily interested in the effect of 
peer group overlap resulting from explicit peer selection by boards. When indexed peer groups are used in RPE 
contracts, performance is simply measured against the median performance of that index. Hence, the constituents of 
the index are not directly observable for those executives, implying that no real strategic interaction exists. Besides, 
firms that use peer groups solely to benchmark the level of compensation are coded as non-RPE firms. 
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can be even more harmful for competitors than merely doing more of one category. Therefore, 
another commonly used measure of competitive aggressiveness is competitive complexity, which 
captures the breadth of a firm's repertoire of competitive actions.2 The higher the complexity, the 
more aggressive a firm acts.  
 To identify the competitive actions, we use structured content analysis of newspaper 
headlines (e.g., Ferrier, 2001; Nadkarni et al., 2016; Rindova et al., 2010). We use the LexisNexis 
database to collect all the newspaper headlines related to our sample firms in the sample period. In 
order to be included in our dataset, headlines need to be written in English and have the firm name 
in the title. Moreover, we require that the firm index associated with the news article assigned by 
LexisNexis matches the firm we search for and remove duplicate headlines. Appendix B provides 
example headlines.  
To measure the volume dimension of competitive aggressiveness, we sum up all the actions 
of a firm per year. For the complexity measure, we need to classify the headlines in different 
categories. Using a machine learning algorithm, we classify the headlines into the following 
categories: capacity, legal, marketing, pricing, and product (Ferrier et al., 1999). We then relate the 
actions in the different categories to the overall number of actions and subtract this fraction from 1 
to derive at our complexity measure. Formally, the measures of volume and complexity are defined 
as follows: 
Aggressiveness Volume = ∑ aij
n
i = 1
= Tj (1) 
 
                                                 
2 The strategic management literature also discusses other forms of competitive aggressiveness such as the deviance 
from industry norms, speediness, and the order of strategic actions (see, e.g., Chen et al., 2010b; Derfus et al., 2008; 
Ferrier, 2001; Ferrier et al., 1999; Nadkarni et al., 2016; Ndofor et al., 2011). In a follow-up analysis we examine the 
effect on the deviance from the industry norms. The results are largely in line with our main results. However, given 
the strong overlap of these measures, we focus on the two most frequently used components in literature in our main 
analysis, i.e., volume and complexity. 
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Aggressiveness Complexity = 1 − ∑(aij Tj⁄ )
2
n
i = 1
 (2) 
where aij is the number of firm j’s actions in the ith action category, Tj is the total number of actions 
carried out by firm j in a given year, and n is the total number of action categories. 
3.4. Capturing Competitive Environment 
While both the volume and the complexity of the competitive actions proxies for the competitive 
aggressiveness of firms, the strategic management literature suggests that the focus of firms on 
either of these dimensions changes with the competitive environment firms are operating in (see, 
e.g., Chen et al., 2010a; Covin and Covin, 1990; Ferrier, 2001; Rindova et al., 2010). That is, in 
fast changing environments like growth industries, firms typically rely on competitive actions that 
are simple and predictable – and as such are easier to grasp – because that strategy yields superior 
market valuations compared to more complex strategies (Chen et al., 2010a; Chen et al., 2010b; 
Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Rindova et al., 2010). In contrast, in more mature and stable markets, 
longer time horizons and often better information warrant more sophisticated strategies where firms 
use a broader repertoire of actions (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Nadkarni et al., 2016).  
 Given that firms use different strategies to achieve their desired level of competitive 
aggressiveness in different life cycle stages of the industry, we also have to split our analysis 
accordingly. Doing so allows us to estimate the effect of peer group overlap on those dimensions 
of competitive aggressiveness that are the dominant strategies in their respective life cycle stages. 
As pointed out before, prior literature has shown that simple and high volume strategies are 
typically associated with firms in the growth stage. Thus, if peer group overlap is associated with 
a higher level of aggressiveness, we expect that firms increase their volume of competitive actions 
when the industry is in the growth stage. In contrast, in the mature stage of the industry life cycle, 
we expect that higher aggressiveness induced by peer group overlap is associated with higher 
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complexity in firms’ actions. Thus, we split our analysis in the different life cycle stages of the 
industry to avoid underestimating the effect of peer group overlap on competitive aggressiveness. 
To empirically capture the different life cycle stages of the industry, we use the measure 
developed by Cantrell and Dickinson (2018). Therefore, we aggregate for each industry the firm 
life cycles based on the patterns of operating, investing, and financing cash flows as defined by 
Dickinson (2011), where the industry classification follows the 48 industry groups identified by 
Fama and French (1997). The industry life cycle is then defined as the life cycle stage where most 
of the firms of the industry are in. In our sample, there are no industries operating in the shake-out 
or decline stage, and only a small number of firms operating in industries in the introduction stage.3 
Hence, our analyses will focus on the two remaining stages: growth and mature.4 
3.5. Empirical models 
In our hypothesis, we predict that peer group overlap increases firms’ competitive aggressiveness. 
To test our hypothesis, we estimate the following equations for the growth and mature industry life 
cycle stages separately, using seemingly unrelated regressions: 
                                                 
3 This is not surprising, but rather consistent with the finding in Cantrell and Dickinson (2018) that nearly 89 percent 
of the industries is in either the introduction, growth or mature stage. 
4 One could argue that the introduction stage is quite similar to the growth stage. Our results are robust to pooling firms 
in the introduction stage with firms in the growth stage. 
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     log
e
Aggressiveness Volume
i,t
= 
                α0 + β1Peer Group Overlapi,t + β2Peer Group Synchroncityi,t + 
                β
3
H&P Number of Peersi,t−1 + β4H&P Peer Similarityi,t−1 + 
                β
5
Size Percentilei,t−1 + β6Tobin
's q Percentilei,t−1+ β7Leverage Percentilei,t−1 + 
                  β
8
Returns Percentilei,t−1 + β9Lossi,t−1 + γ'Year and Industry Indicators + 
                 εi,t                                                                                                                                              (3) 
 
     Aggressiveness Complexityi,t = 
                α0 + β1 loge Aggressiveness Volumei,t
+ β
2
Peer Group Overlapi,t +  
                β
3
Peer Group Synchroncityi,t+ β4H&P Number of Peersi,t−1
 +  
                β
5
H&P Peer Similarityi,t−1 + β6Size Percentilei,t−1 + β7Tobin
's q Percentilei,t−1+  
                β
8
Leverage Percentilei,t−1 + β9Returns Percentilei,t−1 + β10Lossi,t−1 +  
                γ'Year and Industry Indicators + εi,t                                                                                   (4) 
 
where 𝑖 and 𝑡 index firm and year, respectively. Descriptions of all variables are presented in 
Appendix B. 
In Eq. (4), where the dependent variable is Aggressiveness Complexity, we additionally 
control for firms’ competitive volume. The reason for this inclusion is that variation in complexity 
between observations can simply arise due to increased aggressiveness volume. For example, if a 
firm has a very low volume, its complexity will all else equal be low as well. To isolate the 
complexity from the volume effect, we control for the volume in the complexity estimations. 
Further, conceptually we have argued that strategic interaction induced by peer group overlap can 
be a consequence of exploiting RPE’s noise reduction. Consequently, a firm’s level of strategic 
interaction would naturally correlate with its level of noise reduction. To control for this effect, we 
include a proxy for the firm’s level of noise reduction in our estimation. We capture a firm’s level 
of noise reduction by measuring the firm’s stock return synchronicity with its peers (Durnev et al., 
2003; Morck et al., 2000; Piotroski and Roulstone, 2004). Specifically, for each firm-year 
observation, we regress the firm’s daily returns on the daily returns of all peers for a period of three 
years. Peer group synchronicity is then measured as a logarithmic transformation of the R2 obtained 
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from that estimation, to create an unbounded continuous variable out of the variable originally 
bounded by 0 and 1. By construction, high values in this measure indicate firms whose stock returns 
are closely tied to peers stock returns and, hence, measure high levels of noise reduction. The 
correlation between the level of noise reduction and peer group overlap is positive and significant 
(p < 0.01, two-tailed). 
We include two proxies of product market competition, to control for the fact that our RPE 
strategic interaction proxy may capture some variation attributable to regular product market 
competition instead. We control for the number of product market competitors and their similarity 
with the focal firm, as defined by Hoberg and Phillips (2010, 2016). Moreover, to control for 
industry factors and time trends, we include industry fixed effects based on the 48 industry groups 
identified by Fama and French (1997) and year fixed effects in our estimations. We opt to control 
for industry fixed effects based on Fama and French’s classification rather than Hoberg and 
Phillips’ classification, since our equations already include measures of product market 
competition as defined by Hoberg and Phillips (2010, 2016). Hence, inclusion of Fama and 
French’s industry fixed effects allows us to incrementally control for a different set of industry 
drivers.5 Further, we control for firm-specific fundamentals that may affect competitive 
aggressiveness. Specifically, we control for the relative firm’s size (natural logarithm of total 
assets), growth opportunities (natural logarithm of Tobin’s q), leverage (natural logarithm of debt-
to-equity ratio) and stock returns, all calculated as a percentile compared to the RPE firm’s peers 
at the beginning of the period. We do so as the relative standing within the peer group is more 
important for strategic interaction of a firm with its peers than the absolute fundamentals of the 
                                                 
5 The results are robust to different industry classifications. Tests using the 25 or 50 FIC industry groups identified by 
Hoberg and Philips (2010, 2016) as industry fixed effects produce similar significant results. 
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firms, which can be heavily influenced by industry characteristics. Finally, we also include an 
indicator variable for firms that made a loss in the previous period.  
 
4. RESULTS 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics are summarized in Table 1. Panel A presents summary statistics for the full 
RPE sample. Panel B presents t-tests for differences in mean summary statistics between RPE firms 
with and without peer group overlap. Pearson correlation coefficients among all variables are 
presented in Table 2. Peer Group Overlap has a mean value of 0.140, indicating that approximately 
one in seven firm-peer relationships is an overlapping peer relationship. The competitive 
aggressiveness variables are moderately correlated with each other. The uncorrelated fraction, 
however, indicates that these variables capture distinct variance and, thus, distinct dimensions of 
competitive aggressiveness.  
>> TABLE 1 << 
>> TABLE 2 << 
4.2. Peer Group Overlap and Competitive Aggressiveness 
Table 3 presents the results of estimating Eqs. (3) and (4), which model competitive aggressiveness 
as a function of peer group overlap and the control variables. We estimate and present the equations 
for each competitive environment separately. Columns (1) and (2) presents the results for the 
growth stage, and columns (3) and (4) present the results for the mature stage.  
In the growth stage, we find that peer group overlap is significantly associated with firms’ 
competitive aggressiveness. Specifically, Peer Group Overlap shows a positive and significant 
relationship with Aggressiveness Volume in column (1) (p < 0.05, two-tailed). With respect to the 
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complexity dimension (column 2), we find no significant association with Peer Group Overlap. 
These findings are consistent with our prediction that peer group overlap in growing industries 
encourages firms to act aggressively by taking a higher volume of actions. Interestingly, we also 
find a positive and significant relationship between H&P Number of Peers and Aggressiveness 
Volume (p < 0.10, two tailed). This suggests that if there is a stronger competition in the product 
market among the RPE firms, firms get more aggressive. Moreover, firms with strong noise 
reduction effects take less complex actions, indicated by the negative relationship between Peer 
Group Synchronicity and Aggressiveness Complexity in column (2) (p < 0.10, two tailed). 
In the mature stage, we also find that peer group overlap is significantly associated with 
firms’ competitive aggressiveness. Specifically, Peer Group Overlap shows a positive and 
significant relationship with Aggressiveness Complexity in column (4) (p < 0.01, two tailed). With 
respect to the volume dimension (column 3), we find no significant relationship. These findings 
are in line with our prediction that peer group overlap in the mature stage encourages firms to act 
aggressively through taking more complex actions. Contrary to the growth stage, the effect of 
regular product market competition is in the opposite direction, as indicated by the negative and 
significant relationship between H&P Number of Peers and Aggressiveness Complexity in column 
(4) (p < 0.01, two tailed).  
Altogether, the results in Table 3 support our hypothesis and indicate that if there is higher 
peer group overlap firms’ also show a higher competitive aggressiveness. While peer group overlap 
is associated with higher aggressiveness volume in growth environments, it is associated with more 
complex actions in mature environments.  
>> TABLE 3 << 
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4.3. Exogenous Peer Group Changes 
To corroborate our findings and dig deeper into the causal nature of our results, we exploit the fact 
that the level of peer group overlap may vary over time, e.g., when adjustments to peer groups are 
made. If a firm decides to modify its peer group such that newly added peers result in overlapping 
peer relationships, the increase in peer group overlap can be considered to be endogenous. 
However, for the peer that gets added, such an addition is an exogenous shock affecting its peer 
group overlap. Therefore, we examine all peer group composition changes for our sample and 
identify which changes exogenously affect peer group overlap, by either an addition or removal of 
a peer. We find 30 additions and seven removals affecting peer group overlap, of which 28 
additions and six removals occur in the growth stage. Due to the limited number of removals, we 
focus our analysis on the 28 additions in the growth stage.  
We expect that firms that are exogenously added as peers (“treatment group”) respond by 
increasing their competitive aggressiveness. The limited number of observations restricts our 
statistical power, therefore, we opt for weighted t-tests using an entropy balanced control group to 
control for potential differences between the groups (Hainmueller, 2017). Specifically, we examine 
the treatment group’s competitive aggressiveness in the year after the exogenous addition, with a 
similar-sized entropy balanced control group of RPE firms that have no peer group overlap at all. 
We balance on the natural logarithm of Aggressiveness Volume and Aggressiveness Complexity in 
the current year, and significant predictors in Eqs. (3) and (4), i.e., Size Percentile, Tobin’s q 
Percentile, Year Indicators and Industry Indicators. After balancing, none of the differences in the 
two aggressiveness variables, Size Percentile, Tobin’s q Percentile, Year Indicators and Industry 
Indicators is significant (all p > 0.98).  
Table 4 presents the results of the weighted t-tests for differences in the competitive 
aggressiveness between the treatment and control group in the year after the exogenous addition. 
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We find that the treatment group’s competitive aggressiveness is significantly higher subsequent 
to the exogenous addition to another firm’s peer group. Specifically, we find that the treatment 
group’s Aggressiveness Volume is significantly higher compared to the control group (p < 0.10, 
one-tailed). For the Aggressiveness Complexity we do not find a significant difference. These 
findings are consistent with our main findings and indicate that peer group overlap increases 
competitive aggressiveness by encouraging firms to take more frequent actions when industries are 
in the growth stage. 
>> TABLE 4 << 
4.4. RPE Firms versus Non-RPE Firms 
The main argument of this paper is that peer group overlap within RPE contracts creates significant 
strategic interaction, which affects the competitive aggressiveness. One concern could be that the 
peer group overlap is a rather small component in explaining the competitive aggressiveness 
compared to what RPE contracts in general induce. Inconsistent with such concerns, Aggarwal and 
Samwick (1999a, 1999b) show in their model that strategic interaction between two firms is 
considerably higher if both firms use a contract based on peer performance. If only one firm uses 
a contract based on peer performance, the increase in strategic interaction compared to non-RPE 
settings is rather small. This suggests that the peer group overlap component is more important in 
explaining the competitive aggressiveness compared to RPE in general. To examine this argument 
empirically, we extend our main analysis in this section and investigate whether RPE itself has an 
effect on competitive aggressiveness, compared to non-RPE firms.  
 We estimate modified versions of Eqs. (3) and (4), whereby we include an indicator variable 
for RPE firms (RPE), benchmarked against non-RPE firms, and an interaction between RPE and 
Peer Group Overlap to examine the incremental effect of peer group overlap (setting Peer Group 
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Overlap equal to zero for all non-RPE firms).6 In addition, we replace the control variables based 
on the firm’s percentile rank compared to its peer group with similar variables computed based on 
the group of product market competitors as defined by Hoberg and Phillips (2010, 2016), because 
non-RPE firms do not have an RPE peer group. 
 Table 5 presents the results of estimating the modified versions of Eqs. (3) and (4). Similar 
to the main analysis, we estimate and present the equations for the different industry life cycle 
stages separately. Columns (1) and (2) present the results for the growth stage, and columns (3) 
and (4) present the results for the mature stage. In the growth stage, we find that RPE is not 
significant, whereas RPE×Peer Group Overlap is significantly positively associated with 
Aggressiveness Volume (p < 0.05, two-tailed). Further, RPE + RPE×Peer Group Overlap is 
significantly different from zero (p < 0.05, two-tailed). This indicates that competitive 
aggressiveness in the growth stage is not significantly different between non-RPE firms and RPE 
firms without any overlap, while RPE firms with peer group overlap have significantly higher 
competitive aggressiveness compared to non-RPE firms. In the mature stage, we find that RPE 
firms without overlap have higher volume (p < 0.01, two-tailed) and lower complexity (p < 0.10, 
two-tailed) compared to non-RPE firms. This strategy is inconsistent with the optimal strategies 
identified in the strategic management literature. In contrast, the effect of peer group overlap in 
RPE contracts is consistent with the strategy identified in strategic management literature. We find 
that both RPE×Peer Group Overlap and RPE + RPE×Peer Group Overlap are significantly 
positive with respect to Aggressiveness Complexity (p < 0.05) and significantly negative with 
respect to Aggressiveness Volume (p < 0.05). These results show that peer group overlap is 
                                                 
6 The non-RPE group consists of S&P 1500 firms that do not use RPE for executive performance evaluation purposes, 
whereby we exclude the financial and utilities sector. 
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associated with lower aggressiveness volume and higher aggressiveness complexity compared to 
non-RPE firms in the mature stage. This is consistent with our main findings. 
Taken together, these results show that compared to non-RPE firms, RPE without peer 
group overlap has no effect during the growth stage and affects competitive aggressiveness in the 
opposite direction of what theory would suggest in the mature life cycle stage. We do not have a 
clear explanation for this surprising finding during the mature stage, but leave it to future research 
to examine this in further detail. However, more importantly, the results show that peer group 
overlap in RPE contracts indeed is associated with higher aggressiveness compared to non-RPE 
firms, as indicated by their increased volume during the growth stage and higher complexity during 
the mature stage. Thus, peer group overlap in RPE contracts is a crucial component to increase the 
competitive aggressiveness, while RPE itself has only minor effects. 
>> TABLE 5 << 
4.6. Robustness Checks 
We perform several supplementary checks to test the robustness of our main results. 
4.6.1. Aggressiveness Deviance 
Based on prior arguments brought forward in the strategic management literature, we consider the 
complexity dimension to be the appropriate measure of competitive aggressiveness for the mature 
stage of the industry. Critics might argue that it is not the complexity of the actions how firms act 
aggressively in the mature stage, but whether they deviate from the industry norms. Therefore, we 
extend our main analysis and compute a measure of aggressiveness dissimilarity or deviance from 
industry norms (Ferrier et al., 1999; Ndofor et al., 2011). 
 To get an accurate estimate of the “industry norm” complexity, we gather competitive 
aggressiveness data for the non-RPE group, and supplement it with our RPE data. We then group 
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our data by the 50 text-based fixed industry classifications (FIC) identified by Hoberg and Phillips 
(2010, 2016) and year, and compute for each industry-year the average proportion of actions for 
each action category (i.e., capacity, legal, marketing, pricing and product). For each firm, we 
subsequently compute the deviation from the average proportion for each category, square all 
deviations, and sum it. The result is a measure bounded between zero and one that captures the 
extent to which a firm's competitive repertoire differs from industry norms. More formally: 
Aggressiveness Deviance = ∑ (aij Tj⁄ − (ai T⁄̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ))
2
n
i = 1
 (5) 
where aij is the number of firm j’s actions in the ith action category, Tj is the total number of actions 
carried out by firm j in a given year, (ai T⁄̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) is the industry mean proportion (excluding the focal 
firm) of the ith action category, where the industry indicators follow the 50 FIC industry groups, 
and n is the total number of action categories. 
 Table 4 presents the results of re-estimating Eq. (3), whereby we replace the dependent 
variable with Aggressiveness Deviance.7 For completeness, we run the regression for both the 
growth (column 1) and the mature stage (column 2). The findings are similar to our findings 
regarding the complexity dimension. Specifically, as expected, we find no significant relationship 
between Peer Group Overlap and Aggressiveness Deviance in the growth stage, whereas we find 
a positive and significant relationship in the mature stage (p < 0.05, two tailed). This provides 
additional evidence for our hypothesis and shows that the complexity induced by peer group 
overlap in mature environments is associated with more unique aggressiveness strategies. 
>> TABLE 6 << 
                                                 
7 In this model, we do not explicitly control for Aggressiveness Volume. For Aggressiveness Deviance this is not 
necessary, because Aggressiveness Deviance basically compares the firm’s Aggressiveness Complexity with the firm’s 
industry average Aggressiveness Complexity. Thus, the volume effect cancels out in this computation. 
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4.6.2. Additional Competitive Environment Proxies 
In our main analysis, we split our analysis in the different life cycle stages of the industry, using 
the comprehensive industry life cycle measure from Cantrell and Dickinson (2018). In this section, 
we test the robustness of our results using alternative proxies for the competitive environment. 
Specifically, we use the level of product market competition (Hoberg and Phillips, 2010, 2016), 
the level of product substitutability, entry costs, concentration and the size of the industry (Karuna, 
2007), the industry average return on assets, industry average net financial obligations (Dickinson, 
2011), industry average level of risk-taking (Armstrong and Vashishtha, 2012) and the industry 
average level of investments (Richardson, 2006) to corroborate our main analysis. 
Table 7 presents the means and results of the t-tests for differences in the underlying 
components between the growth and mature stages. Industries in the growth stage have larger 
product market competition, higher product substitutability, higher entry costs, lower 
concentration, and are larger.8 Besides, industry in the growth stage have higher net financial 
obligations, higher risk-taking, and higher investment levels.  
Subsequently, we re-estimate Eqs. (3) and (4), but instead of estimating separate equations 
for each competitive environment, we interact Peer Group Overlap with each of the underlying 
proxies. In untabulated results, we find that seven out of the ten alternative specifications show 
patterns consistent with our main findings (the exceptions are the specifications where the 
additional proxy is H&P Median Similarity, Product Substitutability, and Concentration). Hence, 
we conclude that our earlier findings are robust to using alternative measures for the competitive 
environment.  
>> TABLE 7 << 
                                                 
8 Growing industries in our sample are larger in terms of assets, mainly because the oil and gas industry is classified 
as a growing industry due to its significant growth in the period preceding 2014. 
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4.6.3. Firm Life Cycle 
Cantrell and Dickinson (2018) show that firms that are leaders or laggards have different strategies. 
In their study, leaders (laggards) are defined as firms that are in a firm life cycle leading (lagging) 
the industry life cycle. Taking their finding into account, we re-estimate all equations in our study, 
whereby we also include the firm’s life cycle as a control variable to control for this leader/laggard 
effect. Untabulated results indicate that the firm’s life cycle does not explain much variation in our 
aggressiveness measures. We only find that mature firms in growing industries have higher 
aggressiveness volume (p < 0.01, two-tailed). Most importantly, our main findings are robust to 
controlling for firm life cycle. 
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This study investigates how peer group overlap in RPE contracts influences competitive 
aggressiveness. Specifically, we exploit variation in peer group overlap (Firm A selects Firm B as 
peer and vice versa), and hypothesize that this overlap induces strategic interaction between those 
firms. The results are in line with our prediction and show that higher peer group overlap is 
associated with increased firms’ competitive aggressiveness. Specifically, the results show that in 
growing environments, firms with higher peer group overlap take more frequent competitive 
actions, while firms operating in mature environments act more aggressively by taking more 
complex actions, which deviate from industry norms. 
Our study contributes to the literature by isolating the strategic interaction component, 
which can, but not necessarily is present in RPE contracts, from the noise reduction component of 
RPE. We provide evidence that RPE contracts affect firms’ competitive aggressiveness when 
strategic interaction is induced by peer group overlap. In contrast to prior studies that often neglect 
the strategic interaction component, our study explicitly exploits differences in RPE contracts with 
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and without strategic interaction by identifying its effect on executives’ decisions. By 
distinguishing this element, we provide important insights for future research and, more practically, 
for boards designing executive compensation contracts.  
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APPENDIX A. EXAMPLE RPE CONTRACT 
The following text is an excerpt from the proxy statement of Unit Corporation, where the board 
explains the use of RPE (Unit Corporation, 2015).  
 
To further increase the tie of NEO [Named Executive Officers] pay to performance, 
the committee increased the performance-based component of the awards to 40% 
from the 30% it had used in prior years. The time-vested 60% of the award vests 
in three equal annual installments starting March 9, 2015. The performance-based 
shares will vest in an amount that will be determined based on application of 
the following formula, which measures total stockholder return as compared to 
that of the 2014 Peer Group:9 
 
Total Stockholder Return (“TSR”) = 
Ending stock price − Beginning stock price + Dividends
Beginning stock price
 
 
For purposes of the formula, the ending and beginning common stock price used 
will be calculated using the average of the closing price of our common stock on 
the NYSE for the 15-trading-day period ending on the start and end of the 
designated performance period (February 18, 2014 to February 18, 2017) and the 
peer companies' stock prices will be determined in the same manner. 
 
The committee believes that TSR is a readily understood and commonly used measure 
of corporate performance, and that a comparison of the company’s TSR to that of 
a group of our peer companies is a useful measure of our performance on a relative 
basis. The committee also believes that using TSR as a measure aligns our 
management with our stockholders.  
 
The number of performance-based shares that ultimately vest for the NEOs will be 
determined by the TSR of the company relative to the TSR of the 2014 Peer Group 
at the end of the performance period, as follows: 
 
 
 
Interpolation will be used to determine the percentage of the awards that will 
vest when performance falls between the percentile ranks set forth in the table 
above.  
                                                 
9 In February 2014, when our NEOs' 2014 long–term incentive compensation was determined, 
the committee approved a peer group consisting of the following companies (the "2014 
Peer Group"): 
 
Atlas Pipeline Partners, LP  Newfield Exploration Company 
Cabot Oil & Gas Corporation  Parker Drilling Company 
Cimarex Energy Company   Patterson – UTI Energy, Inc. 
Denbury Resources, Inc.   Pioneer Energy Services Corporation 
Forest Oil Corporation   SM Energy Company 
Helmerich & Payne, Inc.   Whiting Petroleum Corporation 
  
Unit Corporation, (2015, p. 24).  
Company’s Performance Percentile Rank 
(Unit TSR vs. Peer TSR) 
Vesting 
(% that will vest) 
> 90% 
90% 
75% 
60% 
50% 
40% 
< 40% 
150% 
150% 
125% 
100% 
75% 
50% 
0% 
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APPENDIX B. VARIABLE DEFINITIONS AND MEASUREMENT 
See Table B1.  
 
Table B1 
This table describes all variables used in this paper and if necessary calculations and external sources. 
Panel A: Aggressiveness 
Aggressiveness Volume 
 
Aggressiveness Complexity 
 
Aggressiveness Deviance 
Proxy variables for a firm’s competitive aggressiveness for the period 
indicated by the subscript. Aggressiveness Volume captures the total 
number of competitive actions. Aggressiveness Complexity captures the 
extent to which a firm's repertoire of actions is composed of actions of 
different types. Aggressiveness Deviance captures the extent to which a 
firm's competitive repertoire deviates from industry norms. 
     The computation is as follows. To capture a firm’s competitive 
actions, we utilized a structured content analysis approach based on 
newspaper headlines identified in LexisNexis for each firm’s fiscal period 
2012–2014. We used an algorithm to classify the newspaper headlines 
into the following preestablished categories: capacity, legal, marketing, 
pricing and product. This methodology is established in the competitive 
dynamics literature to measure the competitive actions of firms (see, e.g., 
Ferrier, 2001; Ferrier and Lyon, 2004; Ferrier et al., 1999; Ndofor et al., 
2011). Subsequently, we compute the following variables: 
 
Aggressiveness Volume = ∑ aij
n
i = 1
= Tj 
Aggressiveness Complexity =  1 − ∑(aij Tj⁄ )
2
n
i = 1
 
Aggressiveness Deviance = ∑ (aij Tj⁄ − (ai T⁄̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ))
2
n
i = 1
 
 
   where  
− aij is the number of firm j’s actions in the ith action category 
− Tj is total number of actions carried out by firm j in a given year 
− (ai T⁄̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) is the industry mean proportion (excluding focal firm) of 
the ith action category, where industries are defined based on the 
50 industry groups identified by Hoberg and Phillips (2010, 2016) 
− n is the total number of action categories 
 
Example of newspaper headlines include: 
− Abbott completes acquisition of medical device firm Topera for 
$250m (capacity) 
− Electronic Arts sues Zynga for copyright infringement (legal) 
− Aetna sponsors the Delta Foundation Walk in Washington 
(marketing) 
− Ford cuts price of 2014 focus electric compact car by 10% to draw 
consumers (pricing) 
− McDonald's launches 'Batman Burger' (product) 
 
(continued on next page) 
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Table B1 (continued) 
This table describes all variables used in this paper and if necessary calculations and external sources. 
Panel B: RPE and Peer Group Attributes 
RPE An indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s proxy statement explicitly 
states that at least one component of executive compensation is 
determined based on the firm’s performance relative to the performance 
of other firms in the period indicated by the subscript, zero otherwise.  
     For example: “Performance shares are earned on the basis of our 
Total Shareholder Return (“TSR”) measured over a three year period, 
relative to the TSR of the following 12 companies: C.H. Robinson 
Worldwide, Inc.;  Con-way, Inc.; Expeditors International of 
Washington, Inc.; FedEx Corporation; Hub Group, Inc.; J.B. Hunt 
Transport Services, Inc.; Knight  Transportation, Inc.; Landstar System, 
Inc.; Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc.; United Parcel Service, Inc.; UTi 
Worldwide, Inc.; and Werner Enterprises, Inc.” (Forward Air 
Corporation, 2015, p. 23). 
Peer Group Overlap The number of firm-specific overlapping peer relationships scaled by the 
total peer group size of that firm for the period indicated by the subscript. 
An overlapping peer relationship is present if two firms have a (i) an RPE 
contract, and (ii) both have each other self-selected as peer for 
performance evaluation purposes.  
     In the example below, peer group overlap for Firm A is 0.4. The 
reasoning is as follows. Firm A has five peers, of which two peers (B and 
C) do not have an RPE contract and three peers (X, Y and Z) do have an 
RPE contract. From the latter group, two peers (X and Z) also  have Firm 
A self-selected as their peer, resulting in an overlap in peer selection. 
Therefore, from Firm A’s point of view there are two overlapping peers, 
which is 40 percent of the total peer group.  
 
 
 
Exogenous Additions The number of exogenous additions to a peer group for the period 
indicated by the subscript. An exogenous addition is the event where one 
firm get selected by another firm as a peer, resulting in an overlap in peer 
selection, i.e., after the former firm already selected the latter firm as peer. 
 
(continued on next page) 
Firm A 
(RPE) 
 
Peer 
group: 
– Firm B 
– Firm C 
– Firm X 
– Firm Y 
Firm C 
(no RPE) 
Firm B 
(no RPE) 
Firm Z 
(RPE) 
 
Peer group: 
– Firm A 
– Firm X 
– Firm Y 
 
Firm X 
(RPE) 
 
Peer group: 
– Firm A 
– Firm B 
– Firm C 
 
Firm Y 
(RPE) 
 
Peer group: 
– Firm B 
– Firm C 
– Firm X 
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Table B1 (continued) 
This table describes all variables used in this paper and if necessary calculations and external sources. 
Panel C: Competitive Environment 
Industry Growth An indicator variable equal to one if the majority of the firms within one 
industry are in the growth life cycle stage for the period indicated by the 
subscript, where (i) the life cycle classification follows the cash flow 
proxy developed by Dickinson (2011), and (ii) the industry classification 
follows the 48 industry groups identified by Fama and French (1997).  
Industry Mature An indicator variable equal to one if the majority of the firms within one 
industry are in the mature life cycle stage for the period indicated by the 
subscript, where (i) the life cycle classification follows the cash flow 
proxy developed by Dickinson (2011), and (ii) the industry classification 
follows the 48 industry groups identified by Fama and French (1997). 
Panel D: Controls 
Peer Group Synchronicity A proxy for the firm’s level of noise reduction in the period indicated by 
the subscript. Peer Group Synchronicity is computed as the firm’s stock 
return synchronicity with its peers, using a procedure similar as utilized 
by Durnev et al. (2003), Morck et al. (2000) and Piotroski and Roulstone 
(2004). Specifically, the firm’s daily stock returns are regressed on the 
daily stock returns for all peers: 
 
Stock Returnsi,t = α0 + β
′ ∑ Stock Returnsj,t + εi,t
n
j=1
 
 
where i, j, t index firm, peer and day, respectively. The regression is 
estimated for each firm-year using 675 daily observations, i.e., for a 
period of three years, conform the RPE performance period.   
     Peer Group Synchronicity is then computed as: 
 
log
e
(
R2
1 − R2
) 
 
where R2 is the coefficient of determination from the estimation above. 
The natural logarithm transformation of  R2 creates an unbounded 
continuous variable out of the originally bounded by 0 and 1 variable. 
H&P Number of Peers A proxy for the firm’s product market competition in the period indicated 
by the subscript. H&P Number of Peers is the natural logarithm of the 
number of peers a firm competes with in its product market, as defined 
by Hoberg and Phillips (2010, 2016). 
H&P Peer Similarity A proxy for the firm’s product market competition in the period indicated 
by the subscript. H&P Peer Similarity is the natural logarithm of the 
median similarity score of all peers a firm competes with in its product 
market, as defined by Hoberg and Phillips (2010, 2016). 
     This proxy supplements H&P Number of Peers. For example, 
consider a product market which is small yet intense. In that case, 
although H&P Number of Peers is low, H&P Peer Similarity will be high 
and pick up the variance of the intense competitive environment. 
Size Percentile The firm’s size percentile rank in its RPE peer group in the period 
indicated by the subscript. Size is computed as the natural logarithm of 
the total assets. 
 
(continued on next page) 
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Table B1 (continued) 
This table describes all variables used in this paper and if necessary calculations and external sources. 
Panel D: Controls (continued) 
Size H&P Percentile The firm’s size percentile rank in its group of product market competitors 
in the period indicated by the subscript, as defined by Hoberg and Phillips 
(2010, 2016). Size is computed as the natural logarithm of the total assets. 
Tobin's q Percentile The firm’s Tobin’s q percentile rank in its RPE peer group in the period 
indicated by the subscript. Tobin’s q is computed as the natural logarithm 
of Tobin's q ratio, calculated by dividing the sum of the firm’s equity 
value, book value of long-term debt, and current liabilities by the total 
assets. 
Tobin's q H&P Percentile The firm’s Tobin’s q percentile rank in its group of product market 
competitors in the period indicated by the subscript, as defined by Hoberg 
and Phillips (2010, 2016).  Tobin’s q is computed as the natural logarithm 
of Tobin's q ratio, calculated by dividing the sum of the firm’s equity 
value, book value of long-term debt, and current liabilities by the total 
assets. 
Leverage Percentile The firm’s leverage percentile rank in its RPE peer group in the period 
indicated by the subscript. Leverage is computed as the natural logarithm 
of debt to equity ratio in the period indicated by the subscript. 
Leverage H&P Percentile The firm’s leverage percentile rank in its group of product market 
competitors in the period indicated by the subscript, as defined by Hoberg 
and Phillips (2010, 2016). Leverage is computed as the natural logarithm 
of debt to equity ratio in the period indicated by the subscript. 
Returns Percentile The firm’s stock returns percentile rank in its RPE peer group in the 
period indicated by the subscript. 
Returns H&P Percentile The firm’s stock returns percentile rank in its group of product market 
competitors in the period indicated by the subscript, as defined by Hoberg 
and Phillips (2010, 2016). 
Loss An indicator variable equal to one if the net income before extraordinary 
items is negative in the period indicated by the subscript, zero otherwise. 
Panel E: Industry Components 
Product Substitutability The extent of product substitutability in an industry for the period 
indicated by the subscript (Karuna, 2007). 
Market Size The level of market size in an industry for the period indicated by the 
subscript (Karuna, 2007). 
Entry Costs The level of entry costs in an industry for the period indicated by the 
subscript (Karuna, 2007). 
Concentration The four-firm concentration ratio for the period indicated by the subscript 
(Karuna, 2007). 
Industry Return on Assets The average firm’s return on assets in an industry for the period indicated 
by the subscript. 
Industry Net Financial 
Obligations 
The average firm’s net financial obligations scaled by assets for the 
period indicated by the subscript (Dickinson, 2011). 
Industry Risk-Taking The average firm’s risk-taking in an industry for the period indicated by 
the subscript (Armstrong and Vashishtha, 2012). 
Industry Investments The average firm’s investment levels in an industry for the period 
indicated by the subscript (Richardson, 2006). 
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Table 1 
This table presents summary statistics for the full sample. Panel A presents summary statistics for the full 
RPE sample. Panel B presents t-tests for differences in mean summary statistics between RPE firms with 
and without peer group overlap. All variables are defined in Appendix B. 
Panel A: Summary Statistics for Full RPE Sample 
  Mean Std. Dev. Min 10th  Median 90th Max 
Aggressiveness                 
Aggressiveness Volume 16.427 18.642 0.000 0.000 9.000 49.000 64.000 
loge Aggressiveness Volume 2.204 1.256 0.000 0.000 2.303 3.912 4.174 
Aggressiveness Complexity 0.317 0.267 0.000 0.000 0.364 0.667 0.889 
Aggressiveness Deviance 0.158 0.172 0.000 0.009 0.089 0.381 0.902 
Peer Group Attributes         
Peer Group Overlap 0.140 0.164 0.000 0.000 0.083 0.378 0.727 
Peer Group Synchronicity 0.500 0.718 –2.396 –0.426 0.564 1.350 2.101 
Exogenous Additions Indicator 0.092 0.289 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Competitive Environment         
Industry Introduction 0.085 0.280 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Industry Growth 0.511 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Industry Mature 0.404 0.491 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Controls         
H&P Number of Peers 3.733 1.348 0.693 1.946 3.773 5.458 6.052 
H&P Peer Similarity 0.029 0.020 0.000 0.009 0.024 0.062 0.089 
Size Percentile 0.429 0.221 0.000 0.123 0.429 0.740 1.000 
Tobin's q Percentile 0.430 0.277 0.000 0.056 0.436 0.800 1.000 
Leverage Percentile 0.441 0.270 0.000 0.077 0.429 0.800 1.000 
Returns Percentile 0.447 0.284 0.000 0.058 0.444 0.833 1.000 
Loss 0.100 0.301 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.300 1.000 
Panel A: Summary Statistics Comparison within RPE Sample 
  
Mean Value for  
RPE with Overlap 
Mean Value for  
RPE without Overlap t-test 
Aggressiveness     
loge Aggressiveness Volume 2.234 2.193    0.320 
Aggressiveness Complexity 0.331 0.288    1.600 
Aggressiveness Deviance 16.170 15.637    0.115 
Peer Group Attributes     
Peer Group Overlap 0.210 0.000  23.292*** 
Peer Group Synchronicity 0.706 0.081    8.324*** 
Competitive Environment   
    
  
Industry Introduction 0.114 0.034    3.450*** 
Industry Growth 0.622 0.284    7.331*** 
Industry Mature 0.263 0.682  –9.159*** 
Controls   
    
  
H&P Number of Peers 4.026 3.200    6.168*** 
H&P Peer Similarity 0.033 0.020    7.396*** 
Size Percentile 0.461 0.361    4.415*** 
Tobin's q Percentile 0.410 0.482  –2.660*** 
Leverage Percentile 0.471 0.372    3.831*** 
Returns Percentile 0.452 0.440    0.417 
Loss 0.127 0.047     3.103*** 
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Table 2 
This table presents Pearson's correlations coefficients between the independent variables. Bold indicates significance at a two-tailed probability level 
of 5%, or better. All variables are defined in Appendix B. 
  A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P 
Aggressiveness Volume A                 
loge Aggressiveness Volume B 0.86                
Aggressiveness Complexity C 0.41 0.54               
Aggressiveness Deviance D –0.43 –0.59 –0.36              
Peer Group Overlap E 0.08 0.14 0.17 –0.01             
Peer Group Synchronicity F –0.10 –0.11 0.04 0.09 0.27            
Exogenous Additions Indicator G –0.04 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.32 0.16           
Industry Introduction H 0.02 0.07 0.04 –0.10 –0.08 –0.06 –0.10          
Industry Growth I –0.10 –0.07 0.01 0.09 0.44 0.30 0.28 NA         
Industry Mature J 0.09 0.03 –0.03 –0.04 –0.40 –0.27 –0.23 NA NA        
H&P Number of Peers K 0.03 0.07 0.09 0.02 0.44 0.16 0.20 –0.09 0.45 –0.40       
H&P Peer Similarity L 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.42 0.02 0.16 –0.09 0.31 –0.27 0.43      
Size Percentile M 0.23 0.19 0.22 –0.09 0.12 0.26 0.06 –0.01 –0.10 0.11 –0.01 –0.08     
Tobin's q Percentile N 0.01 0.05 0.05 –0.07 0.04 0.00 –0.10 0.02 0.01 –0.01 –0.10 –0.04 –0.18    
Leverage Percentile O 0.11 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.13 0.04 0.03 0.02 –0.01 –0.01 –0.05 0.06 0.24 –0.04   
Returns Percentile P –0.04 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.11 –0.05 0.01 0.04 –0.05 0.01 –0.02 –0.05 0.26 0.02  
Loss Q –0.07 –0.03 –0.04 0.02 0.12 –0.03 0.04 0.08 0.04 –0.09 0.10 0.16 0.06 –0.24 0.06 –0.09 
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Table 3 
     This table provides results examining the effect of peer group overlap on competitive aggressiveness, and tests H1. Competitive aggressiveness 
is measured as the firm's competitive volume and complexity. Volume captures the total number of competitive actions and complexity captures 
the extent to which a firm's repertoire of actions is composed of actions of different types. Considering that competitive aggressiveness is contingent 
on the competitive environment, the equations are estimated separately for different competitive environment, as proxied by the industry life cycle. 
Columns (1) and (2) present the results for the growth cycle, and columns (3) and (4) present the results for the mature cycle. The equations are 
estimated using seemingly unrelated regressions models. The industry indicators follow the 48 industry groups identified by Fama and French 
(1997). *, ** and *** indicate significance at two-tailed probability levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix 
B. 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 Industry Growth Cycle  Industry Mature Cycle 
  
loge Aggressiveness 
Volumet 
Aggressiveness 
Complexityt 
  
loge Aggressiveness 
Volumet 
Aggressiveness 
Complexityt 
loge Aggressiveness Volumet    
 0.092*** (0.018)     
 0.140*** (0.015) 
Peer Group Overlapt  1.009** (0.444)  0.011 (0.098)  – 1.229 (0.958)  0.616*** (0.209) 
Peer Group Synchronicityt – 0.170 (0.135) – 0.054* (0.030)   0.292** (0.137)  0.056* (0.030) 
H&P Number of Peerst-1  0.188* (0.096) – 0.004 (0.021)  – 0.025 (0.086) – 0.061*** (0.019) 
H&P Median Similarityt-1 – 6.707 (4.919) – 0.607 (1.083)  – 11.695** (4.659) – 0.386 (1.031) 
Size Percentilet-1  0.661* (0.339)  0.162** (0.075)   1.060** (0.428)  0.047 (0.095) 
Tobin's q Percentilet-1 – 0.242 (0.253)  0.080 (0.056)   0.824*** (0.312) – 0.046 (0.069) 
Leverage Percentilet-1 – 0.187 (0.251) – 0.087 (0.055)   0.086 (0.358) – 0.134* (0.077) 
Returns Percentilet-1  0.068 (0.226) – 0.042 (0.050)  – 0.030 (0.265)  0.048 (0.057) 
Losst-1  0.088 (0.218)  0.006 (0.048)  – 0.210 (0.315) – 0.064 (0.068) 
Constant  0.042 (0.557)  0.075 (0.122)   1.958** (0.838)  0.556*** (0.185) 
Year Indicators Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry Indicators Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 236 236  174 174 
Adjusted R² 36.518% 36.084%   53.352% 47.704% 
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Table 4 
     This table provides results examining the effect of exogenous changes in peer group overlap on 
competitive aggressiveness, for firms in the industry growth cycle. Competitive aggressiveness is 
measured as the firm's competitive volume and complexity. Volume captures the total number of 
competitive actions and complexity captures the extent to which a firm's repertoire of actions is composed 
of actions of different types. Column (3) presents weighted t-tests for differences in mean competitive 
aggressiveness between RPE firms that were affected by an exogenous peer group addition ("treatment"), 
and RPE firms without peer group overlap ("control"). The control group is entropy balanced to the 
treatment group using the significant covariates of the main analysis, i.e., Size, Tobin's q, Year Indicators, 
and Industry Indicators. In addition, the sample is balanced on the natural log of Aggressiveness Volume 
and Aggressiveness Complexity in year t. *, ** and *** indicate significance at one-tailed probability levels 
of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix B. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
  Treatment in t + 1 Control in t + 1 Weighted t-test 
Aggressiveness Volume 2.743 2.353  1.408* 
Aggressiveness Complexity 0.413 0.336  1.155 
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Table 5 
This table provides results examining the effect of RPE on competitive aggressiveness. RPE firms are compared to non-RPE firms, and are separated 
into RPE firms with and without peer group overlap. Competitive aggressiveness is measured as the firm's competitive volume and complexity. 
Volume captures the total number of competitive actions and complexity captures the extent to which a firm's repertoire of actions is composed of 
actions of different types. Considering that competitive aggressiveness is contingent on the competitive environment, the equations are estimated 
separately for different competitive environment, as proxied by the industry life cycle. Columns (1) and (2) present the results for the growth cycle, 
and columns (3) and (4) present the results for the mature cycle. The equations are estimated using seemingly unrelated regressions models. The 
industry indicators follow the 48 industry groups identified by Fama and French (1997). *, ** and *** indicate significance at two-tailed probability 
levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix B. 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 Industry Growth Cycle  Industry Mature Cycle 
  
loge Aggressiveness 
Volumet 
Aggressiveness 
Complexityt 
  
loge Aggressiveness 
Volumet 
Aggressiveness 
Complexityt 
loge Aggressiveness Volumet     0.140*** (0.009)      0.125*** (0.006) 
RPEt  0.066 (0.135)  0.017 (0.026)   0.317*** (0.101) – 0.037* (0.020) 
RPEt × Peer Group Overlapt  0.856** (0.417) – 0.012 (0.081)  – 2.097** (0.821)  0.339** (0.163) 
H&P Number of Peerst-1  0.087* (0.051) – 0.011 (0.010)  – 0.059* (0.031) – 0.019*** (0.006) 
H&P Median Similarityt-1 – 0.405 (3.284)  0.358 (0.636)  – 3.190 (2.346)  0.5 (0.465) 
Size H&P Percentilet-1  0.972*** (0.193)  0.096** (0.038)   1.678*** (0.155)  0.135*** (0.032) 
Tobin's q H&P Percentilet-1 – 0.110 (0.184) – 0.01 (0.036)   0.499*** (0.125) – 0.043* (0.025) 
Leverage H&P Percentilet-1  0.023 (0.199) – 0.024 (0.039)   0.187 (0.141)  0.006 (0.028) 
Stock Returns H&P Percentilet-1 – 0.128 (0.179) – 0.05 (0.035)   0.135 (0.119)  0.001 (0.024) 
Losst-1 – 0.069 (0.166)  0.054* (0.032)  – 0.092 (0.100)  0.026 (0.020) 
Constant  0.243 (0.793)  0.349** (0.154)   1.361** (0.588)  0.196* (0.117) 
Year Indicators Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Industry Indicators Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Observations 502 502 
 
1,043 1,043 
Adjusted R² 35.160% 42.424% 
 
47.090% 47.430% 
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Table 6 
     This table provides results examining the effect of peer group overlap on competitive aggressiveness, 
using an alternative aggressiveness dimension. Competitive aggressiveness is measured as the firm's 
competitive deviance. Deviance captures the extent to which a firm's competitive repertoire deviates 
from industry norms. Considering that competitive aggressiveness is contingent on the competitive 
environment, the equations are estimated separately for different competitive environment, as proxied 
by the industry life cycle. Column (1) presents the results for the growth cycle, and column (2) presents 
the results for the mature cycle. The equations are estimated using seemingly unrelated regressions 
models, in conjunction with the equations in Table 3. The industry indicators follow the 48 industry 
groups identified by Fama and French (1997). *, ** and *** indicate significance at two-tailed 
probability levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix B. 
 (1) (2) 
 Industry Growth Cycle Industry Mature Cycle 
  Aggressiveness Deviancet 
Peer Group Overlapt – 0.094 (0.073)  0.376** (0.169) 
Peer Group Synchronicityt  0.015 (0.022) – 0.029 (0.024) 
H&P Number of Peerst-1 – 0.001 (0.016)  0.013 (0.015) 
H&P Median Similarityt-1  0.421 (0.804)  1.553* (0.820) 
Size Percentilet-1 – 0.021 (0.055) – 0.162** (0.075) 
Tobin's q Percentilet-1  0.010 (0.041) – 0.102* (0.055) 
Leverage Percentilet-1  0.018 (0.041)  0.065 (0.063) 
Returns Percentilet-1  0.022 (0.037)  0.006 (0.047) 
Losst-1 – 0.017 (0.036) – 0.042 (0.055) 
Constant  0.294 (0.091)  0.139 (0.148) 
Year Indicators Yes Yes 
Industry Indicators Yes Yes 
Observations 236 174 
Adjusted R² 10.113% 20.688% 
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Table 7 
     This table provides results examining fundamental differences between the underlying components that 
form competitive environments. Column (1) presents fundamentals for the growth cycle, and column (2) 
presents fundamentals for the mature cycle. Column (3) presents t-tests for differences in mean 
fundamentals between the growth and mature cycle. *, ** and *** indicate significance at two-tailed 
probability levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix B. 
    (3) 
  Industry Growth Cycle Industry Mature Cycle t-test 
H&P Number of Peers 110.105 54.456    7.009*** 
H&P Median Similarity 0.034 0.022    6.620*** 
Product Substitutability 1.276 1.202    6.566*** 
Market Size 14.38 13.369    9.891*** 
Entry Costs 11.066 9.671  12.150*** 
Concentration 0.424 0.504  –5.671*** 
Industry Return on Assets 0.043 0.049  –2.386** 
Industry Net Financial Obligations 10,886.619 –17,739.223    7.202*** 
Industry Risk-Taking 1.694 1.134  11.536*** 
Industry Investments 1.895 1.132     8.805*** 
 
